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Chapter 9
Cyber Conflict as an Emergent 
Social Phenomenon
Dorothy E. Denning
Naval Postgraduate School, USA
INTRODUCTION
Warfare is inherently social. Soldiers train and 
operate in units, fighting and dying for each other 
as much as for their countries. Cyber conflict is 
also social, but whereas traditional warriors work 
and socialize in physical settings, cyber warriors 
operate and relate primarily in virtual space. 
They communicate electronically and meet in 
online forums, where they coordinate operations 
and distribute the software tools and knowledge 
needed to launch attacks. Their targets are elec-
tronic networks, computers, and data.
The Emergence of Cyber 
Conflict, or Hacking for Political 
and Social Objectives
Although conflict appears throughout human his-
tory, its manifestation in cyberspace is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. After all, digital computers 
did not appear until the 1940s, and computer net-
works until the 1960s. Attacks against computers 
and the data they held emerged in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, but they were perpetrated more 
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for money and revenge than as an instrument of 
national and international conflict. Typical crimes 
included bank fraud, embezzlement, information 
theft, unauthorized use, and vandalism (Parker, 
1976). Teenage hacking arrived on the scene in 
the 1970s, and then grew in the 1980s, as young 
computer users pursued their desire to explore 
networks, have fun, and earn bragging rights. By 
the end of the decade, the single biggest attack 
on the Internet was a computer worm launched 
by a college student simply as an experiment. 
Within this mix of playful hacking and serious 
computer crime, cyber conflict, or hacking for 
political and social objectives, emerged, taking 
root in the 1990s and then blossoming in the 
2000s. Now, it accounts for a substantial share of 
all cyber attacks, as well as some of the highest 
profile attacks on the Internet, such as the ones 
perpetrated by patriotic Russian hackers against 
Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008.
The Hacker Group Phenomenon
From the outset, hackers and cyber criminals 
have operated in groups. In his examination of 
early computer-related crime, Donn Parker found 
that about half of the cases involved collusion, 
sometimes in groups of six or more (Parker, 1976, 
p. 51). Youthful hackers met on hacker bulletin 
boards and formed clubs, one of the earliest and 
most prestigious being the Legion of Doom (Den-
ning, 1999, p. 49), while serious criminals formed 
networks to traffic in cyber crime tools and booty, 
such as stolen credit cards. Today, there are perhaps 
tens or hundreds of thousands of social networks 
engaging in cyber attacks. While many of these 
networks were formed for fun or financial gain, 
others arose for the purpose of engaging in cyber 
conflict. Individuals, often already connected 
through hacker groups or other social networks, 
came together to hack for a cause.
The Purpose of This Chapter
This chapter examines the emergence of social 
networks of non-state warriors launching cyber 
attacks for social and political reasons. These 
networks support a variety of causes in such areas 
as human and animal rights, globalization, state 
politics, and international affairs. This chapter 
examines the origin and nature of these networks; 
their objectives, targets, tactics, and use of online 
forums. It also describes the relationship, if any, 
to their governments.
THE NATURE OF NON-
STATE NETWORKS
Unlike states, non-state networks of cyber soldiers 
typically operate without the constraints imposed 
by rigid hierarchies of command and control, for-
mal doctrine, or official rules and procedures. In-
stead, they operate in loosely-connected networks 
encouraging and facilitating independent action in 
support of common objectives--what is sometimes 
characterized as “leaderless resistance.”
However, while the networks are decentralized, 
they are not actually leaderless. A few individu-
als, often already connected outside cyberspace 
or from previous operations, effectively take 
charge, or at least get things started. They articu-
late goals and strategy, plan and announce cyber 
attacks, encourage people to participate, and 
provide instructions and tools for participating. 
They manage the online forums--websites, web 
forums and groups, discussion boards, chat rooms/
channels, email lists, and so forth--supporting 
network activities. They also develop or acquire 
the automated software tools used by the group. 
Often, the tools themselves give the leaders some 
control over the conduct of cyber attacks (e.g., se-
lection of targets and rate of attack), compensating 
for the lack of a hierarchical command structure 
over the network players.
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The net effect is that non-state cyber war-
riors are able to mobilize and conduct attacks 
on relatively short notice, unconstrained by the 
need to follow time-consuming protocols or wait 
for an approval process to move through a chain 
of command. Further, the networks can grow to 
include thousands of participants, as resources 
are not needed to pay, train, or relocate individual 
warriors. Assuming adequate bandwidth, an online 
forum that supports a small cyber army can just 
as easily support a large one.
Online forums play a vital social role in the 
formation, growth, and operation of cyber conflict 
networks. Participants use the forums to acquire 
information, discuss issues, and get to know each 
other. The forums foster a sense of group identity 
and community, while rhetoric on the forums 
stirs up emotions, inspires action, and promotes a 
sense of “us vs. them.” Newcomers see that others 
are engaged in, or planning to engage in, cyber 
attacks—leading to the overarching perception 
that such activity is normative for the group. By 
observing this collective behavior, they are more 
easily influenced to set aside any personal reserva-
tions and go along with the group, especially if 
they can do so with little risk and exposure, hiding 
in the cyber crowd behind a veil of relative ano-
nymity. The forums also serve as a support base 
for operations, providing a means for distributing 
cyber attack tools and information about how to 
use the tools and what targets to attack, as well 
as coordinating the attacks. Participants may be 
encouraged to compete for recognition or prizes, 
based on who conducts the most attacks.
THIS CHAPTER’S FOCUS: 
HACKTIVISM, ELECTRONIC JIHAD, 
AND PATRIOTIC HACKING
With this background in place, the chapter now 
examines three areas of cyber conflict: (1) hacktiv-
ism, (ii) electronic jihad, and (iii) patriotic hack-
ing. Hacktivism, combining hacking with social 
and political activism, is the broadest area; it can 
involve small groups of local activists or large 
groups crossing international boundaries and com-
ing together over the Internet. Targets are typically 
government institutions, including both national 
and international bodies, but they also include 
businesses and other non-state groups. Electronic 
jihad refers to cyber attacks conducted in support of 
the terrorist group al-Qa’ida and the global jihadist 
movement associated with it. Targets include both 
government and non-government entities across 
the globe, but especially in the United States and 
other Western countries. Patriotic hacking covers 
state-on-state conflict, but the perpetrators of the 
cyber attacks are citizens and expatriates rather 
than governments. Targets are both government 
and non-government entities in the opposing state.
Although these three areas of conflict are dis-
cussed separately, they are not disjoint. Indeed, 
hacktivism is often used to cover all non-state 
social and political hacking, and hence could be 
considered as encompassing the other two areas.
There are some areas of conflict not addressed 
in this chapter, most notably conflicts involving 
racists and extremists engaging in hate crimes and 
terrorism. However, electronic jihad exemplifies 
this general area of conflict and how it plays out 
on a large scale across the Internet. Another area 
not covered is conflict at an individual level. 
Instead, the chapter focuses on conflicts relating 
to broader societal issues.
The following sections discuss each area of 
these three key areas in greater depth. For each 
type, motives, social networks, and activities are 
described, and case studies are used to illustrate 
general principles and historical developments. 
The final section concludes and discusses impli-
cations for the future.
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HACKTIVISM
Defined
Hacktivism is the convergence of hacking with 
activism. It arose when social activists with com-
puter skills began hacking for a cause, usually 
within networks of other activists.
Cases of Hacktivism
In one of the earliest reported cases of hacktiv-
ism, protestors unleashed a computer worm into 
the National Aeronautic and Space Administra-
tion’s computer network as a means of protesting 
nuclear weapons. In addition to spreading, the 
worm displayed the message “Worms Against 
Nuclear Killers. Your System Has Been Officially 
WANKed. You talk of times of peace for all, and 
then prepare for war.” The attack took place in 
late 1989, while anti-nuclear activists protested 
NASA’s launch of the space shuttle carrying 
the Galileo probe on its initial leg to Jupiter, as 
Galileo’s booster system was fueled with radioac-
tive plutonium. The protestors failed to stop the 
launch, but the worm took a month to eradicate 
from NASA’s computers, costing the space agency 
an estimated half million dollars in wasted time 
and resources (Denning, 1999, p. 281).
Cyber conflict took off with the introduction 
of the Web in the 1990’s. Websites were not only 
handy targets to attack, but also visible to the 
public, making the attacks themselves more vis-
ible. In addition, activists could use websites to 
publicize forthcoming operations, distribute the 
tools and information needed to participate, and 
coordinate the actual attacks. Two general types 
of attack emerged and became commonplace: 
(i) defacements of websites with political and 
social messages, and (ii) Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
attacks--disrupting access to target websites, usu-
ally by flooding them with traffic.
One of the first web defacements was per-
formed in 1996 to protest The Communications 
Decency Act (CDA), a controversial law later 
ruled unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. 
Hackers replaced the US Department of Justice 
home page with a page that read “Department 
of Injustice” and included pornographic content 
censored by the act (Attrition, 1996). Another early 
defacement was performed by an international 
group of hackers opposed to nuclear weapons. 
Called Milw0rm, the group hacked the web site 
of India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center shortly 
after India’s nuclear weapons tests in 1998, replac-
ing the content with anti-nuclear messages and a 
picture of a mushroom cloud. The group of six 
hackers, whose ages ranged from 15 to 19, hailed 
from four countries: the United States, England, the 
Netherlands, and New Zealand (Denning, 2001).
Since then, web defacements have become 
common, and while most are performed for fun 
and bragging rights, many are motivated by social 
and political issues. Zone-h, which records and 
archives web defacements, reported that of the 
roughly 480,000 defacements recorded in 2007, 
approximately 31,000 (6.5%) were performed 
for political reasons and another 28,000 (5.8%) 
were performed as expressions of patriotism 
(Zone-h, 2008).
Hacktivists have also “defaced” media other 
than the Web. In 2007, for example, an art group 
called Ztohoven tampered with a TV broadcast in 
the Czech Republic, inserting a mushroom cloud 
in a landscape scene. A video clip of the trans-
mission was posted to YouTube (Mutina, 2007).
Tactics Used by Hacktivists
The tactic of protesting an organization by flooding 
its website with traffic was pioneered by an inter-
national group of activists called Strano Network. 
On December 21, 1995, Strano Network organized 
a one-hour cyber attack against selected websites 
associated with the French government. At the ap-
pointed hour, participants from all over the world 
were instructed to access the target websites and 
rapidly hit the “reload” key over and over to clog 
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the sites with traffic. The objective of the DoS 
attack was to protest French government policies 
on nuclear and social issues by disrupting access 
to key government sites. Following the strike, a 
posting on the Internet proclaimed it had been ef-
fective in shutting off access to some of the sites 
and drawing media attention. The message also 
asserted that the strike showed “the existence of a 
world-wide movement able to counteract world-
wide injustice; [and] the capacity to develop [such 
a] movement in a short time” (Denning, 1989, 
p.237; Schwartau, 1996, pp.406-408).
A few years later, a New York group called 
the Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT) auto-
mated Strano Network’s innovative method of 
cyber attack so that participants would not have 
to continually hit the reload key to generate traf-
fic. Instead, they could visit EDT’s website and 
click on a button signaling their desire to join 
the protest. Upon doing so, a software program 
named FloodNet would run on their computer 
and send a rapid and steady stream of packets 
with web page requests to the target site. This is 
sometimes called “HTTP flooding,” as the page 
requests are issued with the web’s HTTP protocol. 
Other Internet protocols have also been used to 
flood websites, including ICMP through “ping” 
requests (“ping flooding”) and TCP through SYN 
requests (“SYN flooding”).
EDT began using their tools in 1998 to support 
the Zapatistas in their struggle against the Mexican 
government. Their first attack, conducted on April 
10, targeted Mexican President Zedillo’s website, 
while their second hit US President Clinton’s site 
(because of US support to Mexico). Their third 
strike was more ambitious, simultaneously target-
ing the websites of President Zedillo, the Pentagon 
(because the US military helped train Mexican 
soldiers carrying out human rights abuses), and 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (because it repre-
sented globalization--which EDT claimed was 
at the root of the problem). EDT estimated that 
10,000 people participated in the attacks (Den-
ning, 1999; Denning, 2001). Since then, EDT has 
sponsored numerous other attacks, which they 
refer to as “virtual sit-ins,” to support a range of 
issues, including the war in Iraq, health care, and 
immigration. An attack conducted in collabora-
tion with the borderlands Hacklab in March 2008 
struck nanotech and biotech firms, because “their 
science is driven by the war (in Iraq) and drives 
the war” (EDT, 2008).
By 1999, the virtual sit-in had become a popular 
means of protest. That year, over 800 animal rights 
protestors used EDT’s FloodNet software against 
websites in Sweden, while a British group calling 
itself the Electrohippies Collective developed its 
own tools and sponsored a massive sit-in against 
the website of the World Trade Organization 
during their meeting in Seattle (which also gener-
ated street demonstrations). The Electrohippies 
estimated that over 452,000 people worldwide 
joined their three-day strike (Cassel, 2000).
EDT’s innovation, which took the form of a 
website with attack software, allowed thousands 
of people to join a strike with very little effort. 
All they needed to do was visit EDT’s website 
and click a button. Mobilizing warriors had never 
been easier. But a later innovation, the “botnet,” 
would give cyber warriors an even more power-
ful weapon. Instead of rounding up thousands of 
volunteers, a single warrior could compromise and 
take over thousands of computers on the Internet. 
This botnet, defined as a network of machines run-
ning robot-like malicious software (bots), would 
then be instructed to attack the target website in 
a robot-like fashion. The resulting attacks are 
often referred to as Distributed Denial-of-Service 
(DDoS) attacks, because of the distributed nature 
of the source of the attack. The term “swarming” 
is also used to denote the swarm-like fashion in 
which multiple agents (bots or people) simultane-
ously strike a common target (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 
2000). Most of the DoS attacks described in this 
chapter are of this nature.
The Electrohippies used their website to in-
troduce another innovation in networked collab-
oration--collective decision making. During an 
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international week of protest against genetically-
modified foods in 2000, visitors to their website 
could vote on whether the final phases of the 
campaign, which included a virtual sit-in, should 
go forward. When the final vote was only 42% 
in favor, with 29% opposed and 29% undecided, 
they cancelled the rest of the campaign. However, 
future actions did not include an opportunity to 
vote, so the Electrohippies may have decided that 
they had yielded too much power to site visitors, 
likely including curious onlookers and persons 
associated with the target.
Cyber activists also use email as a means of 
attack. In 1997, for example, protestors bombarded 
the web-hosting company IGC with a flood of 
email (sometimes called “email bombing”), 
demanding that IGC pull the site of the Euskal 
Herria Journal on the grounds it supported the 
Spanish-based terrorist group ETA. The protestors 
also clogged IGC’s website with bogus credit card 
orders. The effect of the attacks severely impacted 
IGC’s ability to service other customers, lead-
ing them to give way to the protestors’ demands 
(Denning, 2001, p. 270).
In what some intelligence authorities char-
acterized as the first known attack by terrorists 
against a country’s computer systems, an offshoot 
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
claimed responsibility for “suicide email bomb-
ings” against Sri Lankan embassies. Calling 
themselves the Internet Black Tigers, the group 
swamped Sri Lankan embassies with about 800 
emails a day over a two-week period in 1998. The 
messages read, “We are the Internet Black Tigers 
and we’re doing this to disrupt your communica-
tions” (Denning, 1999, p. 69).
During the early days of cyber activism in 
the late 1990s, someone created a Hacktivism 
email list for persons interested in hacking and 
activism. Following discussions on the list about 
“jamming up” the Echelon global surveillance 
system operated by the US, UK, Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand, October 21, 1999, was named 
Jam Echelon Day. On that day, activists were to 
send out email messages filled with subversive 
keywords such as “revolt,” causing the messages 
to be snagged by Echelon’s filters—thereby clog-
ging the system with useless intercept data. Word 
spread around the Internet and generated media 
attention. But when the day came, the Hacktiv-
ism list, along with various political email lists, 
were the recipients of massive amounts of the 
nonsense email, leading the news service ZDNet 
to characterize it as a “spam farce” (Knight, 1999).
The Church of Scientology: Key 
Target for Cyber Activists
The Church of Scientology has been the target 
of cyber activists for years, often in response to 
the Church’s efforts to censor leaked informa-
tion about itself. In January 2008, cyber activ-
ists stepped up their assaults, launching Project 
Chanology to “expel the church from the Internet” 
and “save people from Scientology by reversing 
the brainwashing.” The project, growing to about 
9,000 people, used a DDoS attack to cripple the 
Scientology website for two weeks. It also pub-
lished on the Web censored materials and personal 
information about Church leaders (Fritz, 2008).
The activists behind Project Chanology took 
advantage of the Internet’s relative anonymity by 
using Anonymous accounts. Other activists, most 
notably the founders of EDT and the Electrohip-
pies, have operated in the open, revealing their true 
names and taking responsibility for their actions. 
However, whereas the relatively small leadership 
of these groups have disclosed their identities 
and even spoken at conferences, the thousands 
of participants in their cyber operations have not.
The Role of Lycos Europe
Another leadership core that revealed its identity 
was Lycos Europe, an email service provider 
launching a campaign against spammers in 2004. 
Participants in the Make Love, Not Spam cam-
paign installed a special screen saver generating 
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a slow stream of traffic against websites used by 
spammers. The campaign claimed that 110,000 
screensavers irritated 100,000 spam sites over a 
one-month period (Make Love Not Spam, 2004). 
It also generated negative publicity, as critics ar-
gued the participants were essentially spamming 
the spammers’ websites.
Cautionary Note
Although this section has focused on activists de-
ploying cyber attacks, it is important to emphasize 
that most activists do not engage in cyber attacks. 
Rather, they use the Internet to publish information 
about the issues, generate support, sponsor letter 
writing campaigns and petitions, and coordinate 




Electronic jihad refers to cyber attacks conducted 
on behalf of al-Qa’ida and the global jihadist 
movement associated with it. This movement is 
held together largely through the Internet.
History of the Movement
The first appearance of an al-Qa’ida-associated 
hacker group occurred after the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks, when GForce Pakistan an-
nounced the formation of the Al-Qaeda Alliance 
Online on a U.S. government website it defaced 
on October 17, 2001. Declaring that “Osama bin 
Laden is a holy fighter, and whatever he says 
makes sense,” the group of Pakistani Muslim 
hackers posted a list of demands and warned that 
it planned to hit major U.S. military and British 
websites (McWilliams, 2001b). A subsequent 
message from the group announced that two other 
Pakistani hacking groups had joined the alliance: 
the Pakistan Hackerz Club and Anti India Crew. 
Collectively, the groups had already defaced hun-
dreds of websites, often with political messages.
Although GForce expressed support for bin 
Laden, they distanced themselves from terror-
ism. In an October 27, 2001, defacement of a US 
military website, they proclaimed that they were 
“not a group of cyber terrorists.” Condemning the 
attacks of September 11 and calling themselves 
“cyber crusaders,” they wrote, “ALL we ask for 
is PEACE for everyone.” This turned out to be 
one of their last recorded defacements. GForce 
Pakistan and all mention of the Al-Qaeda Alliance 
Online disappeared.
Other hackers, however, have emerged in 
their place, engaging in what is sometimes called 
“electronic jihad.” Jihadist forums are used to 
distribute manuals and tools for hacking and to 
promote and coordinate cyber attacks, including a 
DoS attack against the Vatican website (triggered 
by Pope Benedict’s comments about the Prophet 
Mohammad)--which mainly fizzled, and an 
“Electronic Battle of Guantanamo” attack against 
American stock exchanges and banks, canceled 
because the banks had been notified (Alshech, 
2007; Gross & McMillan, 2006).
The al-Jinan forum has played a particularly 
active role, distributing a software tool called 
Electronic Jihad, used by hackers to participate 
in DoS attacks against target websites deemed 
harmful to Islam. The forum even gives awards 
to the most effective participants, where the ob-
jective is to “inflict maximum human, financial 
and morale damage on the enemy by using the 
Internet” (Bakier, 2007).
The al-Farouq forum has also promoted 
electronic jihad, offering a hacker library with 
information for disrupting and destroying enemy 
electronic resources. The library held keylogging 
software for capturing keystrokes and acquiring 
passwords on compromised computers, software 
tools for hiding or misrepresenting the hacker’s 
Internet address, and disk and system utilities for 
erasing hard disks and incapacitating Windows-
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based systems. Postings on the forum in 2005 
called for heightened electronic attacks against 
US and allied government websites (Pool, 2005a). 
On another jihadist forum, a posting in October, 
2008, invited youths to participate in an ‘electronic 
jihadist campaign’ against US military systems 
by joining the Tariq Bin-Ziyad Brigades. The 
recently-formed group was looking to increase its 
ranks so it could be more effective (OSC, 2008).
In a February, 2006, report, the Jamestown 
Foundation reported that “most radical jihadi fo-
rums devote an entire section to [hacker warfare].” 
The al-Ghorabaa site, for example, contained 
information on penetrating computer devices and 
intranet servers, stealing passwords, and security. 
It also contained an encyclopedia on hacking web-
sites and a 344-page book on hacking techniques, 
including a step-by-step guide for “terminating 
pornographic sites and those intended for the Jews 
and their supporters” (Ulph, 2006). The forum 
Minbar ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a (The Pulpit of 
the People of the Sunna) offered a hacking manual 
said to be written in a pedagogical style and dis-
cussed motives and incentives for computer-based 
attacks, including political, strategic, economic, 
and individual. The manual discussed three types 
of attack: (i) direct intrusions into corporate and 
government networks, (ii) infiltration of personal 
computers to steal personal information, and (iii) 
interception of sensitive information, such as credit 
card numbers in transit (Pool, 2005b).
Younis Tsoulis, who went by the codename 
Irhabi (Terrorist) 007, also promoted hacking, 
publishing a 74-page manual “The Encyclopedia 
of Hacking the Zionist and Crusader Websites” 
with hacking instructions and a list of vulnerable 
websites on a website he managed (Jamestown, 
2008). Tsoulis was later arrested and sentenced 
to ten years in prison for inciting terrorist murder 
on the Internet.
Triggering Events for 
Electronic Jihad
Electronic jihad, like other acts of cyber protest, 
is often triggered by particular events. Publica-
tion of the Danish cartoons satirizing the Prophet 
Mohammad, for example, sparked a rash of cyber 
attacks as violence erupted on the streets in early 
2006. By late February, Zone-h had recorded 
almost 3,000 attacks against Danish websites. 
In addition, the al-Ghorabaa site coordinated a 
24-hour cyber attack against Jyllands-Posten, 
the newspaper that first published the cartoons, 
and other newspaper sites (Ulph, 2006). A video 
purporting to document a DoS attack against the 
Jyllands-Posten website was later released on the 
jihadist site 3asfh.com. The video was in the style 
of jihadist videos coming out of Iraq, showing that 
the hackers were emulating the publicity tactics of 
violent jihadists (Internet Haganah, 2006).
Jihadists often target websites used to actively 
oppose them. For example, a message posted to a 
Yahoo! group attempted to recruit 600 Muslims 
for jihad cyber attacks against Internet Haganah’s 
website. The motive was retaliation against In-
ternet Haganah’s efforts to close down terrorist-
related websites by reporting them to their service 
providers. Muslim hackers were asked to register 
to a Yahoo! group called Jehad-Op (Reynalds, 
2004). According to the Anti-Terrorism Coalition 
(ATC), the jihad was organized by a group named 
Osama Bin Laden (OBL) Crew, also threatening 
attacks against the ATC website (ATC, 2004).
The use of electronic jihad to support al-Qa’ida 
is explicitly promoted in a book by Mohammad 
Bin Ahmad As-Sālim titled 39 Ways to Serve 
and Participate in Jihâd. Initially published on 
al-Qa’ida’s al-Farouq website in 2003 (Leyden, 
2003), principle 34 in the book discusses two forms 
of “electronic Jihâd:” (i) discussion boards (for 
media operations) and (ii) hacking methods, about 
which the book writes: “this is truly deserving of 
the term ‘electronic Jihâd,’ since the term carries 
the meaning of force; to strike and to attack. So, 
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whoever is given knowledge in this field, then he 
should not be stingy with it in regards to using 
it to serve the Jihâd. He should concentrate his 
efforts on destroying any American websites, as 
well as any sites that are anti-Jihâd and Mujâhidîn, 
Jewish websites, modernist and secular websites” 
(As-Sālim, 2003).
The Value of Inflicting Harm
Al-Qa’ida has long recognized the value of in-
flicting economic harm on the United States, and 
electronic jihad is seen as a tool for doing so. After 
the Electronic Battle of Gauntanomo was canceled, 
a message posted on an Islamist website stated 
how “disabling [sensitive economic American 
websites] for a few days or even for a few hours 
… will cause millions of dollars worth of damage” 
(Alshech, 2007). A message on al-Jinan noted 
that hacking methods could “inflict the greatest 
[possible] financial damage” on their enemies.
According to Fouad Husseing, economically-
damaging cyber attacks are part of al-Qa’ida’s 
long-term war against the United States. In his 
book, al-Zarqawi-al-Qaeda’s Second Generation, 
Husseing describes al-Qa’ida’s seven-phase war as 
revealed through interviews of the organization’s 
top lieutenants. Phase 4, scheduled for the period 
2010-2013, includes conducting cyberterrorism 
against the U.S. economy (Hall, 2005).
Although damages from cyber attacks attrib-
uted to al-Qa’ida and associated hackers so far 
has been minor compared to the damages from 
al-Qa’ida’s violent acts of terror, Husseing’s book 
and other writings suggest that al-Qa’ida may 
be thinking bigger. A posting in a jihadist forum 
advocated attacking all the computer networks 
around the world, including military and telecom-
munication networks, in order to ‘bring about the 
total collapse of the West’ (Alshech, 2007). Of 
course, the idea of shutting down every single 
network is utter fantasy, so vision by itself does 
not translate into a threat.
PATRIOTIC HACKING
Defined
Patriotic or nationalistic hacking refers to networks 
of citizens and expatriates engaging in cyber at-
tacks to defend their mother country or country of 
ethnic origin. Typically, patriotic networks attack 
the websites and email accounts of countries whose 
actions have threatened or harmed the interests 
of their mother country.
The cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007, for 
example, were triggered by the physical reloca-
tion of a Soviet-era war memorial, while those 
against Georgia in 2008 accompanied a military 
confrontation with Russia. Cyberspace provides 
a venue whereby patriotic hackers can vent their 
outrage with little effort and little risk. They can 
be armchair warriors, safe behind their computers. 
Through their online social networks, they become 
part of a cyber force larger than themselves—a 
force with greater impact than they could have 
alone, and one that provides cover for their in-
dividual acts.
History of Patriotic Hackers
Chinese hackers were among the first to form social 
networks of patriotic hackers. Beginning with the 
1998 riots in Jakarta, Indonesia, when Indonesians 
committed atrocities against the Chinese living 
among them, a loose network of Chinese hackers 
came together under a nationalistic banner. The 
network, which Scott Henderson (2007) calls the 
Red Hacker Alliance, and others have called the 
Honker Union of China, was formed from such 
hacking groups as the Green Army and China 
Eagle Union. After gathering on Internet Relay 
Chat (IRC) channels to set a course of action 
against Indonesia, the hackers formed the Chi-
nese Hacker Emergency Conference Center and 
launched coordinated cyber attacks, including web 
defacements and DoS attacks against Indonesian 
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websites and government email boxes (Henderson, 
2007, pp. 9-12).
According to Henderson (2007, p. 13), the 
Indonesian cyber attacks served as both the recruit-
ing and training grounds for the alliance’s next 
mission: attacks against US websites in retaliation 
for the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy 
in Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo conflict. 
The Red Hacker Alliance published a manifesto 
expressing its patriotic mission and including 
quotes from Mao Zedong, such as “The country 
is our country; the people are our people; if we 
don’t cry out, who will? If we don’t do something, 
who will?” (Henderson, 2007, p. 14)
Following the embassy-related attacks, the 
Red Hacker Alliance engaged in a series of cyber 
attacks against foreign countries. These included 
attacks against Taiwan in 1999, following Taiwan-
ese President Li Deng-Hui’s advocacy for a “two-
state-theory,” and then in 2000, in conjunction with 
the Taiwanese elections. Attacks were also aimed 
at Japan in 2000, relating to Japan’s handling of 
events concerning the Nanjing Massacre during 
WWII; in 2004, attacks were related to the disputed 
Diaoyu Islands; and in 2001, attacks were related 
to the US, following the collision of a US EP-3 
reconnaissance plane with a Chinese F-8 fighter 
jet in late April, 2001, resulting in the fighter pi-
lot’s death and China’s detaining the US aircrew 
after an emergency landing (Henderson, 2007).
Most of the attacks became two-sided cyber 
skirmishes, with hackers from both sides attacking 
targets associated with the other. Indeed, the 2001 
strikes against the US may have been triggered 
as much by defacements of Chinese web sites in 
April, 2001, by a hacker perceived to be from the 
US--as by the spy plane incident itself. All in all, 
the incidents looked more like the acts of youthful 
hackers showing off their skills and expressing 
outrage than state-sponsored activity. Indeed, in 
2002, the Chinese government asked their hackers 
to refrain from further attacks, as the anniversary 
of the 2001 attacks drew near (Hess, 2002).
By the time the 2001 spy plane incident had 
died down, the Red Hacker Alliance had grown 
to an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 members. But 
most of the members knew little about computer 
networks and hacking. The attacks were charac-
terized as a “chicken-scratch game of a group of 
children,” “a farcical ‘patriotic show’,” and the 
work of “Red Hackers who were totally clueless 
in terms of technology” (Henderson, 2007, pp. 
44-45).
A network of patriotic US hackers also emerged 
over the spy plane incident. According to iDefense 
(2001b, p. 40), a coalition of hackers calling itself 
Project China formed and began defacing Chinese 
websites on May 1, 2001. The alliance was formed 
from several prominent hacking groups, including 
Hackweiser and World of Hell.
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist at-
tacks and invasion of Afghanistan, the network 
of US hackers regrouped to avenge the attacks. 
Now called the Dispatchers, the patriotic hackers 
defaced several hundred websites associated with 
governments in the Middle East and Palestinian 
Internet service providers, and planned to hit 
targets in Afghanistan. Founded by Hackah Jak, a 
21-year-old security expert from Ohio and former 
member of Hackweiser and Project China, the 
group of 60 hackers included members of World 
of Hell and even some non-US hackers (Graham, 
2001; Peterson, 2001). The group seemed to qui-
etly disappear, however, following appeals from 
industry leaders to refrain from hacking and the 
group’s defacement of a website belonging to a 
company having offices in the World Trade Center 
(WTC) and losing employees on September 11, 
2001 (Graham, 2001).
Another group of hackers going by the name 
“Young Intelligent Hackers Against Terrorism” 
(YIHAT) also surfaced after the September 11, 
2001, attacks. Their objective was to disrupt al-
Qa’ida’s financial resources. However, claims 
that the group had penetrated bank accounts 
associated with Osama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida 
were unsubstantiated, and the group’s website 
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disappeared following cyber skirmishes with other 
hacking groups, most notably GForce Pakistan, 
the group of Pakistani hackers mentioned earlier 
in conjunction with their post September 11, 2001, 
web defacements and announcement of the Al Qa-
eda Alliance Online (McWilliams, 2001a, 2001c).
The Lack of U.S. Patriotic 
Hackers Post-2001
Since 2001, the United States has not seen a large 
and active network of patriotic hackers, perhaps 
because there has not been an international conflict 
or incident that has seriously threatened the US, 
or perhaps because Americans are simply not as 
nationalistic as the Chinese are. During the Iraq 
war (began in 2003), most of the cyber attacks 
originated with social activists and foreign hackers 
from China and elsewhere opposed to the war; 
however, there were not patriotic US hackers 
supporting it.
The Emergence of Patriotic 
Hackers in Other Countries
Patriotic hackers have emerged in other countries 
and regions, however. Pakistani and Indian hackers 
have been defacing each other’s websites since 
the late 1990s over Kashmir and, more recently, 
in 2008 over the Mumbai terrorist attacks. In the 
early days, the Pakistan Hackerz Club (PHC), 
one of the other groups forming the Al Qaeda 
Alliance Online, was among the most prolific 
web defacement groups worldwide (Christen-
son, 1999). Armenian and Azerbaijani hackers 
similarly went after each other’s websites in 2000 
over the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic 
Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan (Williams, 2000).
Israeli and Palestinian/Muslim hackers 
launched cyber attacks after the second intifada, 
or uprising, erupted in the Palestinian territories 
in late September, 2000, following a visit by Ariel 
Sharon to the Temple Mount and the murder of 
three Israeli soldiers. Hackers on both sides de-
faced each other’s websites and launched DoS 
attacks.
By January 2001, over 40 hacker groups/
individuals from 23 countries had hit the web-
sites of eight governments, as well as numerous 
commercial sites, according to iDefense (2001a). 
Both GForce and PHC joined the loosely-formed 
network of Muslim hackers defacing Israeli sites. 
One defacement read: “GForce Declares a War 
against Israel?…. Ok, GForce Pakistan is back. We 
really planned not to come back to the defacing 
scene again, but once again our Muslim brothers 
needed us” (iDefense, 2001a).
A Cautionary Note
It is important to note that the cyber intifada illus-
trates that there is no hard line between electronic 
jihad and patriotic hacking. The attacks can be 
viewed both as electronic jihad by Muslim hackers 
against Israel and as patriotic hacking by Israeli 
and Palestinian hackers (and their external sup-
porters) against each other. In addition, there is 
no hard line between jihadist and patriotic hacker 
networks. Groups such as GForce and PHC have 
used their skills to support the jihad as well as 
their own countries and other Muslim countries 
and territories.
Following the 2000 cyber intifada, hack-
ers aligned with Israel or the Palestinians have 
engaged in repeated cyber skirmishes, often in 
conjunction with incidents taking place on the 
ground. Within 48 hours of Israel’s bombing of 
Gaza in December, 2008, more than 300 Israeli 
websites had been defaced with anti-Israel (and 
anti-US) messages (Higgins, 2008). The hackers 
came from several countries, including Morocco, 
Syria, and Iran. Team Evil, a group of Moroccan 
hackers with a history of attacking Israeli web-
sites, took over an Israeli domain name server 
and redirected Ynet’s English news site and other 
websites to phony web pages condemning the 
Israeli strikes (Paz, 2009). For their part, an Israeli 
alliance called “Help Israel Win” developed and 
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distributed a software tool for conducting DDoS 
attacks against Hamas-friendly sites like qud-
snews.net and Palestine-info.info. According to 
the group, more than 8,000 people had downloaded 
and installed the Patriot software. With websites 
in Hebrew, English, Spanish, French, Russian 
and Portugese, the alliance claims to unite “the 
computer capabilities of many people around the 
world” (Shachtman, 2009).
The cyber attacks against Estonia in April/May, 
2007, and in Georgia in August, 2008, put Russian 
hackers on the front page of news sites. However, 
patriotic Russians have engaged in cyber attacks 
since at least 1999, when the Russian Hackers 
Union defaced a US military website during the 
Kosovo war with anti-NATO messages. But with 
the Estonian attacks, the level of activity dramati-
cally increased. Just before the 2008 Georgian 
cyber assault, Russian hackers attacked Lithuanian 
websites to protest a new law banning the display 
of Soviet emblems. They also issued a manifesto 
called “Hackers United Against External Threats 
to Russia,” calling for a expansion of targets to 
include Ukraine, the rest of the Baltic states, and 
“flagrant” Western nations supporting the expan-
sion of NATO (Krebs, 2008). Then, in January, 
2009, the Russian hackers knocked Kyrgyzstan 
off the Internet (Keizer, 2009).
The Estonian and Georgian cyber assaults 
leveraged large social networks, as well as huge 
botnets of compromised computers scattered all 
over the world, mostly for DoS and DDoS attacks 
(Davis, 2007; Naraine & Danchev, 2008). Postings 
on Russian-language forums exhorted readers to 
defend the motherland and provided attack scripts 
to follow and target websites. The scripts, flooding 
targets with network traffic, allowed participants 
to join a loose network of cyber warriors knowing 
little or nothing about hacking. During the Geor-
gian attacks, the Russian website stopgeorgia.ru 
offered several DoS tools and a list of 36 targets. 
According to one report, the site traced back to the 
Russian Business Network (RBN), a cybercrime 
network based in St. Petersburg, Russia (Georgia 
Update, 2008).
Psychological Analysis and Other 
Reasons for Patriotic Hacking
Rosanna Guadagno, Robert Cialdini, and Gadi 
Evron (2009) offer an interesting social- psycho-
logical analysis of the Estonian conflict. They 
posit that several factors contributed to the assault, 
including: (i) the loss of status of Estonia’s ethnic 
Russian minority, following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and Estonia gaining independence; 
(ii) the anonymity and resulting sense of deper-
sonalization coming from online interaction; (iii) 
group membership and adherence to group norms; 
and (iv) rapid contagion through online forums. 
Because most Russian-language Internet users 
were participating in or endorsing the attacks, such 
behavior became normative and quickly spread.
Despite the ability of non-state actors to in-
flict considerable damage in cyberspace, many 
analysts see a government hand in nationalistic 
cyber attacks, for example, attributing the at-
tacks against Estonia and Georgia to the Russian 
government. Stephen Blank (2008) of the US 
Army War College, for example, writes that “the 
computer attacks … and the other steps taken by 
Moscow against Estonia were acts sanctioned by 
high policy and reflected a coordinated strategy 
devised in advance of the removal of the Bronze 
Soldier from its original pedestal.”
At the same time, there are good reasons to 
believe that the attacks were primarily, if not 
entirely, the work of non-state actors. First, some 
of the attacks have been traced to independent 
persons and to websites operated and frequented 
by independent persons. Second, non-state actors 
are capable of pulling off large-scale attacks such 
as these on their own. They do not need govern-
ment resources, including funding. The attacks are 
cheap, and hackers outside the government have 
the tools and knowledge to launch them. Third, 
while the tactics used—including web deface-
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ments, web flooding, and botnets of compromised 
computer—are regularly used by non-state actors, 
there are good reasons why states would not 
engage in such attacks. They typically violate 
domestic crime statutes and cause considerable 
collateral damage, thereby, also violating law of 
war principles, such as necessity and proportion-
ality. Fourth, states have other means of dealing 
with conflict; for example, diplomacy, sanctions, 
and military operations. Cyber attacks might be 
deployed as part of military operations, but they 
would more likely be precision strikes against 
military targets used for command and control, 
reconnaissance, and communications rather than 
mass attacks against civilian websites. However, 
it is possible that the Russian government played 
some role in the attacks, for example, by encour-
aging or condoning them.
Even when attacks can be traced to government 
computers, it would be presumptuous to conclude 
that they were launched by the state. The computers 
may have been compromised by hackers of any 
nationality. Even if individuals within the govern-
ment were responsible for the attacks, they may 
have been operating on their own, not as agents 
of their government or under direction from their 
government. About 7.4% of the participants in a 
cyber attack against the Mexican Embassy’s Lon-
don website in June, 1999, for example, apparently 
had “.mil” addresses; that is, addresses assigned 
to the US Department of Defense. However, the 
attacks were not conducted by the Department of 
Defence. They were conducted by the Electronic 
Disturbance Theater (discussed earlier), having a 
history of attacking the websites of the US and 
Mexican governments, including the Department 
of Defence websites. The “.mil” participants likely 
visited the EDT website used to generate the at-
tacks, becoming unwitting participants.
One participant in the Estonian attacks, 
Konstantin Goloskokov, was a commissar of the 
pro-Kremlin youth movement Nashi, but he said 
that he and a few friends had operated on their 
own initiative and not under the direction of the 
Russian government (Clover, 2009).
At least so far, non-state actors appear to 
be responsible for most cyber conflict, taking 
advantage of this new medium to conduct rapid, 
large-scale attacks at low cost.
CONCLUSION
Cyber conflict, at least so far, is predominantly 
a non-state activity. Networks of civilian cyber 
warriors come together to hack for a cause. Typi-
cally, the networks center around social activism 
(hacktivism), jihad (electronic jihad), or nation-
alism (patriotic hacking). Tools and tactics are 
adopted from those used by other hackers, while 
online forums provide the principal means of 
organization and support.
Although cyber attacks launched by non-state 
networks have been highly disruptive, they have 
not been lethal or even destructive. Nobody 
has died, and following an attack, services and 
data are restored. The attacks look more like the 
cyber-equivalent of street demonstrations than 
terrorism or warfare, though even street protests 
sometimes become destructive and deadly. When 
Estonia relocated its memorial, for example, riots 
broke out not only in cyberspace, but also on the 
streets, the latter leading to one death and 150 
injuries (Fritz, 2008, p. 33). Similarly, the street 
violence that erupted over the Danish cartoons 
left 139 dead and 823 injured (Cartoon, 2006).
However, even if cyber conflict has not been 
particularly destructive, some of the attacks have 
inflicted substantial financial costs on their targets, 
owing to the disruption of services and the need 
to devote resources to defense and recovery. One 
Estonian bank targeted during the cyber assault 
was said to have lost at least $1 million (Landler 
& Markoff, 2007).
Whether cyber conflict will evolve to some-
thing more destructive is difficult to predict. 
Clearly, some jihadists would like to cause greater 
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harm, though they currently lack the knowledge 
and skills to do so. Other non-state actors may 
also turn to more destructive cyber attacks, just 
as they turn to terrorism, insurgency, and other 
forms of physical violence.
Many critical infrastructures are vulnerable 
to cyber attacks that could be quite destructive, 
even deadly. Already, cyber attacks have caused 
raw sewage overflows, disabled emergency 911 
services, and disrupted health care in hospitals. In 
addition, security researchers have demonstrated 
how cyber attacks could physically destroy electri-
cal power generators (Meserve, 2007). Thus, in the 
presence of both motivated actors and vulnerable 
systems, cyber terrorism could morph from the 
largely theoretical threat it is today to something 
all too real.
Still, most activists are more interested in 
raising awareness about an issue and pressing 
for change rather than inflicting serious harm. 
For them, cyber conflict will retain its character-
istic of being primarily disruptive. Exact tactics, 
however, will change as technology evolves and 
hacking along with it.
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